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Abstract 
Ambitious higher-order theories of consciousness aim to account for conscious 
states when these are understood in terms of what-it-is-like-ness. This paper 
considers two arguments concerning this aim, and concludes that ambitious 
theories fail. The misrepresentation argument against HO theories aims to show that 
the possibility of radical misrepresentation—there being a HO state about a state 
the subject is not in—leads to a contradiction. In contrast, the awareness argument 
aims to bolster HO theories by showing that subjects are aware of all their 
conscious states. Both arguments hinge on how we understand two related notions 
which are ubiquitous in discussions of consciousness: those of what-it-is-like-ness and 
there being something it is like for a subject to be in a mental state. 
This paper examines how HO theorists must understand the two crucial notions if 
they are to reject the misrepresentation argument but assert the awareness 
argument. It shows that HO theorists can and do adopt an understanding—the 
HO reading—which seems to give them what they want. But adopting the HO 
reading changes the two arguments. On this reading, the awareness argument tells 
us nothing about those states there is something it is like to be in, and so offers no 
support to ambitious HO theories. And to respond to the misrepresentation 
understood according to the HO reading is to simply ignore the argument 
presented, and so to give no response at all. As things stand, we should deny that 
HO theories can account for what-it-is-like-ness.  
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1 HO theories of consciousness 
“Consciousness” as Thomas Nagel noted, “is what makes the mind-body problem 
really intractable.” (1974, p. 435) One way to gain traction is to divide the problem 
in two: first explain consciousness in terms of representation; then give a 
physicalist account of representation. We can make the first step, some claim, by 
adopting a higher-order theory of consciousness. This paper argues that such 
theories cannot make this first step (it is not concerned with the second step at all). 
Higher-order (henceforth ‘HO’) theories of consciousness say, roughly, that a state, 
M, is conscious just when its subject, S, has a HO mental state which is about M. 
The HO state must not arise (or must not seem to arise) via inference or 
observation, and the HO state is about M in the sense that it represents M as being 
some way. Although specific HO theories differ in what sort of mental state they 
take the HO state to be—a perceptual (or perceptual-like) state,1 a thought2, or a 
non-occurrent state3—these differences will not concern us here.  
To judge whether a theory succeeds, we need some pre-theoretical grasp of what 
the theory aims to explain. HO theories of consciousness aim to account for 
conscious states. And one way in which a mental state can be said to be conscious is 
when the subject is conscious (i.e., aware) of that state. This understanding is 
captured by the Transitivity Principle (where M is a mental state and S a subject): 
TP M is conscious only if S is aware of M4  
Another way we can understand a state’s being conscious is in terms of the notion 
of “what-it-is-like-ness”. It is consciousness in this sense which Nagel is concerned 
with in the paper quoted above. This notion of consciousness is captured by the 
popular Nagelian Definition: 
                                           
1 (Armstrong, 1968), (Lycan, 1996). 
2 (Rosenthal, 1986), (Weisberg, 2011). 
3 (Carruthers, 2000).  
4 (Rosenthal, 1997), (Rosenthal, 2000). What are sometimes called “self-representational” theories of consciousness 
(see, e.g., (Kriegel, 2009)) also hold that if M is conscious then S is aware of M, but they hold that this is because M 
represents itself. Although some of what follows applies to such theories (see §3), this paper focuses on HO 
theories. 
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ND M is conscious iff there is something it is like for S to be in M5 6 
There are other ways of making sense of a state’s being conscious. In particular, 
some philosophers appeal to the notion of a state’s being phenomenally conscious. 
Often, this is closely tied to the idea of a state’s being conscious in the what-it-is-
like sense, but sometimes this connection is resisted.7 I will remain agnostic on the 
relation between what-it-is-like-ness and phenomenal consciousness. This paper is 
concerned with consciousness as understood in terms of TP, consciousness as 
understood in terms of ND, and how they are related. 
HO theories are well-placed to account for states that are conscious in the TP 
sense. One way in which we can be aware of a mental state, M, (as required by TP) 
is by having a HO thought which represents M as being some way. Importantly, if 
we understand TP in this way (as I henceforth will) it doesn’t require that S be in 
M, or that M even exist: that M is conscious in this sense is a matter of how M 
(mentally) appears to be to the subject, not how M is. Whether HO theories can 
account for what-it-is-like-ness, however, is controversial. Some “modest” HO 
theorists don’t aim to provide such an account. “Ambitious” theorists, on the 
other hand, do, and it is with ambitious theories that we will be concerned here.8 
I’ll consider two arguments relevant to ambitious HO theories. The misrepresentation 
argument aims to show that these theories fail because they allow for cases of radical 
misrepresentation: a HO state can represent the subject as being in a state they are 
not in. In contrast, the awareness argument supports HO theories. This argument 
aims to show that what-it-is-like-ness requires that subjects be aware of their 
conscious states, a fact which HO theories are particularly well placed to account 
for. Both arguments hinge on how we understand the related notions of: 
                                           
5 For appeals to the definition see, e.g., (Tye, 1997, p. 290), (Rosenthal, 2000, p. 275), (Kriegel, 2006, p. 58), 
(Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson, 2007, p. 129), (Weisberg, 2011, p. 417–18). 
6 Some ( (Lycan, 1996), (Hacker, 2002), (Snowdon, 2010)) are suspicious of “‘what it is like’-talk”. Although I think 
none gives us good reason to reject this way of talking, I will not argue for that here (see (Farrell ms) for a defence 
of this talk). Instead I will assume, along with most philosophers of mind, that talking in this way is respectable. 
7 For example, (Block, 1997), (Block, 2011), (Kriegel, 2006), (Weisberg, 2011), connect phenomenal consciousness 
to what-it-is-like-ness. Rosenthal (2011) rejects the connection. Yet other notions of a state’s being conscious are of 
those states we are conscious with (Dretske, 1993), and of monitoring and access consciousness (Block, 1997). 
8 The modest/ambitious distinction is Block’s (2011). Ambitious theorists include Rosenthal (2000), Gennaro 
(2004), and Weisberg (2011). Lycan counts as a modest theorist, but perhaps only in the uninteresting sense that he 
denies that there is any clear notion of what-it-is-like consciousness that requires explanation (Lycan, 1996). 
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SOMETHING There is something it is like for S to be in M. 
WHAT There is an occurrence of what-it-is-like-ness associated with M.9 
Thus to assess the arguments—and so to assess the viability of HO theories of 
consciousness—we will need to look at these notions in more detail. 
In §2 and §3 respectively, I will describe the misrepresentation and awareness 
arguments and show how, if HO theorists are to reject the former but assert the 
latter, they must understand WHAT and SOMETHING.10 I’ll also show that this 
requires HO theorists to understand these notions in non-standard ways. In §4 I’ll 
show that HO theorists do understand these notions in this way and so it seems as 
if they can respond to the misrepresentation argument while asserting the 
awareness argument. But, as I’ll argue, things are not as they prima facie seem to 
be. If we adopt the HO reading of WHAT and SOMETHING then the awareness 
argument is uninteresting and offers no support to ambitious HO theories. And 
although HO theorists can respond to the misrepresentation argument when this is 
understood according to the HO reading, this doesn’t help them respond to the 
misrepresentation argument as it is intended to be understood, which is not 
according to the HO reading.11 
It is perhaps worth stressing that, although this paper focuses on what we might 
call semantic or conceptual matters, the ultimate topic of interest is consciousness, 
not ‘consciousness’. The knowledge and conceivability arguments against 
physicalism each rely on claims about epistemology but aim to deliver a 
                                           
9 There is an occurrence of what-it-is-like-ness associated with mental state M (e.g., a migraine state) at some time 
when, at that time, what it is like to be in M (e.g., to have a migraine) contributes to what it is like for the subject 
overall. 
10 Those who have explicitly adopted this stance—in particular, Rosenthal, and Weisberg—are proponents of 
higher-order thought theories of consciousness. But in principle, anyone who favours a HO theory of consciousness 
requires a response to the misrepresentation argument, and may well be tempted by the awareness argument. And, 
as noted above, the awareness argument is also endorsed by proponents of self-representational theories of 
consciousness. Moreover, appeals to the notions of WHAT and SOMETHING are ubiquitous in philosophical 
discussions of consciousness. Examining these notions is, then, relevant to the general question of what it is for a 
mental state to be conscious. 
11 An alternative method would be to argue for a particular way of understanding SOMETHING and WHAT, and see 
whether it has/lacks the relevant entailments. But, although clarifying exactly how we should understand 
SOMETHING and WHAT is an important task, it is also a complicated and controversial matter and one that I have 
taken up elsewhere (Farrell ms). (For other attempts, see (Hacker, 2002), (Lormand, 2004), (Hellie, 2004), (Hellie, 
2007), (Snowdon, 2010), (Janzen, 2011), (Stoljar, 2016).) Further, as we’ll see, we don’t need to provide a full 
account of SOMETHING or WHAT in order to conclude that ambitious HO theories fail. 
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metaphysical conclusion. Discussing the relevant epistemic matters is not to turn 
away from questions about the nature of consciousness. Likewise, the two 
arguments considered here hinge on claims about how we understand SOMETHING 
and WHAT, but that doesn’t mean that their conclusions—or the conclusions of 
this paper—are not about consciousness but merely concern words or concepts. 
2 The misrepresentation argument 
One objection to HO theories stems from the fact that these theories allow for the 
possibility of misrepresentation.12 A misrepresentation case occurs when the HO 
state represents M as being some way even though the subject is not even in M.13 
The misrepresentation argument assumes a misrepresentation case and deduces a 
contradiction, as follows: 
(M1) M is conscious & S is not in M. 
(M2) If M is conscious, there is something it is like for S to be in M. 
(M3) If there is something it is like for S to be in M, there is an occurrence 
of what-it-is-like-ness associated with M. 
(M4) If there is an occurrence of what-it-is-like-ness associated with M, S is 
in M. 
(M5) If there is something it is like for S to be in M, S is in M. (From (M3, 
M4).) 
(M6) S is in M. (From (M1), (M2), (M5).) 
(M7) S is not in M. (From (M1).) 
(M8) S is in M & S is not in M. (From (M6), (M7).)14 
                                           
12 This is acknowledged by HO theorists, e.g., (Rosenthal, 1986), (Rosenthal, 2011), (Weisberg, 2011). Early 
proponents of arguments from misrepresentation include (Byrne, 1997), and (Neander, 1998); see references in 
(Block, 2011) for more recent versions of such arguments. 
13 Weisberg (2011) calls these radical misrepresentation cases. Non-radical misrepresentation occurs when the subject 
is in M, but the HO state represents M as being other than it is. We are only concerned with cases in which S is not 
in M, and so I’ll henceforth drop the ‘radical’. 
14 This argument is inspired by that given in (Block, 2011). It is not clear to me exactly how Block’s argument is 
intended to go, but it is clear from his paper and the discussion that follows it ( (Rosenthal, 2011), (Weisberg, 2011)) 
that the locus of disagreement concerns how we understand SOMETHING and WHAT. The present statement makes 
this plain. It also makes plain that the argument doesn’t require (what is false) that a state’s being TP-conscious 
means the subject is in that state. 
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Since we end up with a contradiction, we must reject one of the premises of the 
argument. But, the reasoning goes, (M2) follows from ND, the Nagelian definition 
of consciousness, and so can’t be rejected on pain of changing the subject and 
talking about something other than what-it-is-like consciousness (and so 
abandoning an ambitious HO theory). (M3) follows from the very notion of there 
being something it is like for S to be in M, i.e., from SOMETHING. (M4) follows 
from the very notion of there being an occurrence of what-it-is-like-ness, i.e., from 
WHAT (rejecting it “amounts to abusing the notion of what-it-is-like-ness” (Block, 
2011, p. 427)). So we must reject (M1) and deny that misrepresentation cases are 
possible. Thus HO theories—which allow that such cases are possible—cannot 
account for what-it-is-like-ness. 
HO theorists aim to reject the misrepresentation argument by rejecting (M5). Since 
(M5) is entailed by (M3) and (M4), this requires denying one of these premises. 
One response is for HO theorists to emphasise that they understand SOMETHING 
and WHAT in terms of a subject’s being aware of a mental state.15 Presumably the 
counter-argument goes something like this: 
(N1) If S is aware of M, then there is an occurrence of what-it-is-like-ness 
associated with M. 
(N2) It is not the case that: if S is aware of M, then S is in M 
(N3) It is not the case that: if there is an occurrence of what-it-is-like-ness 
associated with M, S is in M. (From (N1), (N2).) 
This argument is valid, and (N3) is the negation of (M4). But (a) is suspect: it’s not 
generally true that a subject’s being aware of a mental state entails that there is an 
occurrence of what-it-is-like-ness associated with it (and the converse of (a) 
delivers an invalid argument).16  Perhaps HO theorists can finesse the notion of 
awareness involved, but we do not need to consider this now. This is because our 
current aim is to establish how HO theorists must understand SOMETHING and 
WHAT if they are to reject the misrepresentation argument. That HO theorists 
                                           
15 Thanks to an anonymous referee for emphasising this response. Both (Rosenthal, 2011) and (Weisberg, 2011) 
offer something like it in reply to (Block, 2011). 
16 An analogous argument replaces WHAT with SOMETHING and concludes with the negation of (M5). Its first 
premise is as suspect as (N1) is. Further, it doesn’t show which premise of the valid argument for (M5) must be 
rejected. 
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understand TP-consciousness as a matter of mental appearances as noted above 
(§1), and exactly how they understand this awareness, or that involved in what-it-is-
like consciousness, does not matter here since the notion of awareness plays no 
role in the misrepresentation argument.17 We return to awareness in §3.18 
How, then, can HO theorists reject either (M3) or (M4)? These premises are 
intended to follow from the very notions of SOMETHING and WHAT. To see how 
the premises can be rejected requires examining how the notions might be 
understood. I’ll consider each premise in turn. 
2.1 (M3): non-occurrent and occurrent readings of SOMETHING 
We might think that (M3) is the premise to reject since it looks to be false: it is not 
true that, just because there is something it is like for S to be in M, there is an 
occurrence of what-it-is-like-ness associated with M. After all, before Mary the 
super-scientist in Jackson’s famous knowledge argument (1982) leaves her a black 
and white room and sees her first coloured object she is (according to the story) 
ignorant of something: she does not know what it is like for her to, say, see red. 
This is not because there is nothing it is like for her to see red: as she sits in her 
room, there is something it is like for her to see red. Mary is ignorant because she 
doesn’t know what it is like for her to see red. Thus ‘there is something it is like for 
Mary to see red’ can be true in situations when there is no occurrence of what-it-is-
like-ness associated with seeing red.19 
To understand the knowledge argument as it is intended, then, requires adopting 
what I’ll call a non-occurrent reading of SOMETHING.20 On such a reading, there being 
something it is like for S to be in M at some time does not entail that, at that time, 
there is an occurrence of what-it-is-like-ness associated with M. All it requires is 
                                           
17 It is true that HO theorists accept (M1) because of the way they understand TP-consciousness. But the 
misrepresentation argument is not sensitive to their reasons for accepting (M1). All that matters insofar as the 
argument goes is that they do accept (M1). 
18 Both Weisberg (2011, p. 411) and Rosenthal (2011, p. 434) propose a further response to the argument: it assumes 
that what-it-is-like-ness is a monadic property of M. But the statement of the misrepresentation argument involves 
no claims about the adicity of what-it-is-like-ness: the argument doesn’t require that ‘M is conscious’ (in (M1) and 
(M2)) has the logical form aF. 
19 Cf. the third way of missing the point of the knowledge argument in (Lewis, 2002). 
20 This point doesn’t require that the knowledge argument succeeds, but only that we understand the situation 
described in Jackson’s thought experiment. 
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that, when S is in M (e.g., when Mary sees red), there is such an occurrence (e.g., 
one of what-it-is-like-ness associated with seeing red). We can contrast this reading 
with an occurrent reading of SOMETHING. On this reading, there being something it 
is like for S to be in M does entail that there is an occurrence of what-it-is-like-ness 
associated with M, but it does not entail that there is such an occurrence any time S 
is in M.21 The reading of SOMETHING as it features in the knowledge argument 
seems to be the standard one. None of the familiar responses to this widely 
discussed argument are of the form: ‘Jackson’s use of “what it is like” and 
“something it is like” is idiosyncratic.’ So consideration of the knowledge argument 
gives us one reason to think that the standard reading of SOMETHING is the non-
occurrent one.22 
A second reason for thinking this is that it is natural to explain why we seek out 
some situations and avoid others by employing the notions SOMETHING and 
WHAT. One of the reasons why I try to avoid having a migraine is that there is 
something it is like for me to have a migraine, and the occurrence of what-it-is-
like-ness associated with a migraine state is unpleasant. But on the occurrent 
reading of SOMETHING, since I am not now having a migraine, it is not true that 
right now there is something it is like for me to have a migraine. Thus the 
“explanation” just given is no explanation at all. But surely this is a mistake: the 
explanation is a good one, and that it is shows that we standardly adopt the non-
occurrent reading of SOMETHING. 
A third reason for thinking that the non-occurrent reading is standard is that, when 
we look at other English sentences which have a similar form to SOMETHING, we 
can see that we adopt the non-occurrent reading of them. The truth now of ‘There 
is some time it takes for Rihanna to run a mile’, for example, doesn’t require that 
Rihanna is now running (or has ever, or will ever, run) a mile. What matters is that, 
when she runs a mile (or were she to run one), it takes (or would take) her some 
                                           
21 To be clear: the difference between the two readings depends on whether there being something it is like for S to 
be in M entails an occurrence of what-it-is-like-ness associated with M. It does not depend on whether there being 
something it is like for S to be in M entails an occurrence of M (i.e., that S is in M). 
22 Those who favour the occurrent reading can, of course, describe Mary’s situation. They say that there would be 
something it is like for Mary to see red, and that Mary does not know what it would be like for her to see red. But that 
they must use different words than are standardly used to describe Mary’s situation just emphasises that this reading 
is non-standard.  
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time to do so. These three considerations show that the non-occurrent reading of 
SOMETHING is the standard one. But to accept (M3) requires adopting the non-
standard, occurrent reading. Thus, we might think, HO theorists can easily reject 
the misrepresentation argument by understanding SOMETHING in the standard way. 
But HO theorists cannot do this because their theories commit them to the non-
standard, occurrent reading of SOMETHING. HO theories are extrinsic theories of 
consciousness (Weisberg, 2011). Such theories hold that consciousness is an 
extrinsic property of states—what determines whether a state is conscious involves 
something distinct from the state itself (e.g., the presence of an appropriate HO 
state). On non-occurrent readings of SOMETHING, to say that there is something it 
is like for S to be in M is to say that when S is in M, S undergoes phenomenology 
associated with M. This cannot be true if what determines whether S undergoes 
phenomenology associated with M depends, in part, on something other than M: S 
can be in M without the extra factor being present. 
Further, as HO theorists understand SOMETHING, there being something it is like 
for S to be in M requires that there be an appropriate HO state about M, and this 
in turn suffices for there being an occurrence of what-it-is-like-ness associated with 
M. But as our discussion of Mary shows, on the standard reading of SOMETHING, 
there being something it is like for Mary to see red doesn’t entail that there is an 
occurrence of what-it-is-like-ness associated with seeing red. Thus HO theorists 
are committed to (M3) and must reject a different premise if they are to 
successfully respond to the misrepresentation argument.23 
2.2 (M4): tight and loose readings of WHAT 
Proponents of the misrepresentation argument understand WHAT in a way which 
guarantees the truth of (M4) (to do otherwise, recall, “amounts to abusing the 
notion of what-it-is-like-ness”): 
                                           
23 We might think that proponents of the misrepresentation argument must also adopt the occurrent reading of 
SOMETHING as it appears in that argument. But things are more complicated. We don’t yet have the tools to see why 
this is so, but see footnote 25 below. 
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(M4) If there is an occurrence of what-it-is-like-ness associated with M, S is 
in M. 
I’ll call a reading of WHAT which delivers (M4) a tight reading since it commits us to 
there being a tight association between, on the one hand, there being an 
occurrence of what-it-is-like-ness associated with M, and, on the other, S being in 
M. We can see the attractiveness of the tight reading if we consider being in pain. 
If there is an occurrence of what-it-is-like-ness associated with pain, we might say, 
one just is in pain: that’s what it is to be in pain.24 On the tight understanding of 
WHAT, then, you can’t undergo what-it-is-like-ness associated with M, unless you 
are in M.25 
If HO theorists are to reject (M4), then they must adopt a loose reading of WHAT. 
On a loose reading, S doesn’t need to be in M for there to be an occurrence of 
what-it-is-like-ness associated with M. One way this could be so (the way favoured 
by HO theorists) is if we understand there being an occurrence of what-it-is-like-
ness associated with, say, having a migraine as an occurrence of representing 
oneself as having a migraine. Clearly, this representing can occur without the 
migraine occurring. So if HO theorists adopt a loose reading of WHAT (as 
Rosenthal (2011) and Weisberg (2011) plausibly do when they reject Block’s 
accusation of abuse), they can reject (M4), and with it the misrepresentation 
argument. 
Whether we adopt a tight or loose reading of WHAT is in principle orthogonal to 
whether we adopt an occurrent or non-occurrent reading of SOMETHING. But the 
standard, non-occurrent reading of SOMETHING fits naturally with the tight reading 
of WHAT. On the non-occurrent reading of SOMETHING, when S is in M, there is 
                                           
24 Note that this doesn’t require that we take the what-it-is-like-ness to be a property, let alone a monadic property, let 
alone a monadic property of M. 
25 We can now see how proponents of the misrepresentation argument can assert the argument whilst adopting a 
non-occurrent reading of SOMETHING. They can do this by pointing out that we can legitimately add a third 
conjunct to (M1). Not only are misrepresentation cases situations in which M is conscious, and S is not in M, they 
are also (as ambitious HO theorists will acknowledge) cases in which there is an occurrence of what-it-is-like-ness 
associated with M. If proponents of the argument adopt a tight reading of WHAT, it follows that S is in M, and so 
the contradiction can still be produced. Can HO theorists avoid the conclusion of this variant of the 
misrepresentation argument? Just as in the case of the original misrepresentation argument, this comes down to how 
they understand SOMETHING and WHAT. What I say in the main text about this applies just as well to the variant 
version of the argument. Thus I’ll only consider the original version henceforth. 
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an occurrence of what-it-is-like-ness. A natural explanation of why this is so is that 
there is a close connection between the what-it-is-like-ness associated with M and 
S’s being in M. But this is just to adopt the tight reading of WHAT. Since the non-
occurrent reading of SOMETHING is the standard reading, and this fits naturally 
with the tight reading of WHAT, this suggests that the tight reading of WHAT is the 
standard one. 
To resist the misrepresentation argument, HO theorists must adopt an occurrent 
reading of SOMETHING and a loose reading of WHAT. In §4 we’ll see that this is 
indeed what HO theorists do. First, however, we must note another constraint on 
how HO theorists must understand these two notions. 
3 The awareness argument 
The awareness argument aims to show that HO theories are better placed to explain 
what-it-is-like consciousness than some rival views. The argument is simple. 
(A1) If M is conscious, then there is something it is like for S to be in M. 
(A2) If there is something it is like for S to be in M, then S is aware of M. 
(A3) If M is conscious, then S is aware of M. (From (A1), (A2).)26 
The conclusion of this argument links consciousness in the what-it-is-like sense 
with consciousness as captured by the transitivity principle. Something like (A3) is 
endorsed by many philosophers.27 It does not, however, garner universal assent.28 
Thus although the claim seems obvious to some, those who accept it need to 
provide some reasons in favour of it, and that is just what the awareness argument 
does. If this argument succeeds, theories of consciousness must accommodate the 
fact that we are aware of our conscious states. If conscious states are indeed, as 
HO theories say, those we represent ourselves as being in, then this either involves, 
                                           
26 Both Rosenthal (2000, p. 275) and Weisberg (2011, p. 439) endorse this line of reasoning. Non-HO theorists who 
give the argument include (Levine, 2007, p. 514), (Janzen, 2011), and (Kriegel, 2012, p. 444). 
27 As well as those just cited as giving the awareness argument, partisans of (A3) include (Church, 1995), (Lormand, 
2004), (and see (Janzen, 2008, p. 113) for a longer list). Although it is generally agreed that what I (following 
(Rosenthal, 2005)) am calling ‘awareness’ is not factive, philosophers may disagree about exactly how (A3) is to be 
understood. Some may hold, for example, that what S is aware of is not merely M, but instead S’s being in M. These 
differences in detail can be ignored in what follows. 
28 See, e.g., (Thomasson, 2008), (Stoljar, 2016). 
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or requires only a short step to reach, the idea of the subject being aware of the 
state. So HO theories are clearly well placed to accommodate (A3). Some rival 
theories of consciousness such as first-order theories of consciousness—which 
say, roughly, that conscious states are those states we are conscious with29—must 
do more work if they are to account for the feature of conscious states (A3) 
highlights. 
The awareness argument is valid, and (A1) follows from the widely accepted 
Nagelian definition, ND. Thus we should accept the argument only if we accept 
premise (A2). Why do HO theorists think we should accept (A2)? It cannot be 
because they take (A2) to be a version of the transitivity principle, TP, i.e., that 
there being something it is like for S to be in M just is M’s being TP-conscious.30 
This is because the awareness argument is offered as support for something like 
this identity claim. Assuming it in order to accept (A2) begs the question. 
Similarly, HO theorists can’t accept (A2) simply because they think it best explains 
what distinguishes states that are conscious in the what-it-is-like sense from those 
that are not. Why think this is the best explanation? The obvious answer is: 
because we distinguish states that are TP-conscious from those that are not by 
noting that we are aware of the former, and there is a close connection between TP 
consciousness and what-it-is-like consciousness. But, again, assuming that this 
close connection holds means assuming what is trying to be shown: that ambitious 
HO theories of consciousness succeed. 
To support an ambitious HO theory by way of the awareness argument requires 
explaining why we should accept (A2) without assuming a tight connection 
between what-it-is-like and TP consciousness. Proponents of the awareness 
argument give us such a reason: we should accept (A2) because it follows from the 
meaning of its antecedent, i.e., of SOMETHING. Rosenthal says that “in any sense of 
the phrase ‘what it’s like’ that has any bearing on consciousness[, w]hen one lacks 
conscious access to a state, there is literally nothing it’s like for one to be in that 
state.” (2000, pp. 275, my emphasis). Weisberg claims that “the ‘for’ stressed by Nagel 
                                           
29 See, e.g., (Dretske, 1995) and (Tye, 1995). 
30 I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting I consider both this and the following explanation of why HO 
theorists think we should accept (A2). 
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is crucial: the notion indicates a subjective awareness of an organism’s mental states by 
the organism itself.” (2011, pp. 439, my emphasis). And Janzen says that, “the very 
language of the what-it-is-like formula, the words in it, suggests that it ought to be read as 
expressing a proposition about a subject’s awareness of her own mental states.” 
(Janzen, 2011, pp. 283, my emphasis). Kriegel also stresses the ‘for’ in SOMETHING 
and suggests that it doesn’t make sense to deny (A2): it is “quite possibly 
incoherent.” (2009, p. 105). The awareness argument, then, hinges on how we 
understand SOMETHING. 
3.1 (A2): self-intimating and non-self-intimating readings of 
SOMETHING 
On what I’ll call a self-intimating reading of SOMETHING, there being something it is 
like for S to be in M entails that S is aware of M. We can resist the awareness 
argument by instead adopting a non-self-intimating reading of SOMETHING. On this 
reading, SOMETHING does not entail that S is aware of M (it does not follow from 
SOMETHING, on this reading, that S is not aware of M).  
Which of these readings of SOMETHING we should accept is independent of 
whether we adopt an occurrent or non-occurrent reading of SOMETHING, and of 
whether we adopt a tight or loose reading of WHAT. But the self-intimating reading 
of SOMETHING does not fit well with the standard, non-occurrent reading of 
SOMETHING. On the latter, there being something it is like for S to be in M does 
not entail that there is an occurrence of what-it-is-like-ness associated with M. This 
sits ill with it being the case that S is aware of M, as is required by the self-
intimating reading of SOMETHING. To go back to Jackson’s Mary, before she leaves 
her room there is (on the standard reading) something it is like for Mary to see red, 
but Mary is not then aware of the mental state of seeing red.31 The self-intimating 
reading of SOMETHING is far more plausible if we adopt the non-standard, 
occurrent reading, which suggests that the self-intimating reading itself is non-
standard. 
                                           
31 As before, noting that Jackson’s use of SOMETHING is standard doesn’t require accepting that the knowledge 
argument is sound.  
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For the awareness argument to succeed, then, requires that we adopt the self-
intimating—i.e., the non-standard—reading of SOMETHING. To do so doesn’t beg 
any questions: the awareness argument aims to show a close connection between 
TP-consciousness and what-it-is-like consciousness, but there being such a 
connection doesn’t entail any claims about how we understand phrases such as 
‘something it is like’. Should we adopt the self-intimating reading? Proponents of 
the awareness argument argue that we should, but, as I’ll now show, their 
arguments are not convincing. 
3.2 Arguments for the self-intimating reading 
Weisberg effectively defends the self-intimating reading of SOMETHING when he 
claims that “the ‘for’ stressed by Nagel is crucial: the notion indicates a subjective 
awareness of an organism’s mental states by the organism itself.” (Weisberg, 2011, 
p. 439)32 But he offers no reason why should we think that this is what this ‘for’ 
means. Appealing to dictionaries doesn’t help here: they don’t include such a 
meaning.33 Since we’re given no reason to think that we should understand ‘for’ in 
this way, the first argument for the claim that we should adopt a self-intimating 
reading of SOMETHING is unpersuasive. 
A second argument can also be found in (Weisberg, 2011). The idea here is that a 
self-intimating reading is “moderate” and so should be preferred to a rival 
“zealous” reading.34 On the “zealous” reading, SOMETHING does not entail that S is 
aware of M (i.e., it is a non-self-intimating reading), but it does entail that 
consciousness is a monadic property of mental states. In contrast, the “moderate” 
reading is a self-intimating reading, but SOMETHING entails nothing about the 
nature of consciousness. Since it involves fewer commitments, Weisberg claims, 
we should prefer the “moderate” reading. It’s not obvious that we should accept 
this “fewer commitments” principle, but even if we do, the argument fails since it 
                                           
32 Some authors seem to suggest that there is an important distinction between, for example, what it is like to see a 
tomato, on one hand, and what it is like for some subject to see a tomato (see, e.g., (Rosenthal, 1997)). But this is not 
obviously so (see (Lormand, 2004), (Hellie, 2007), (Stoljar, 2016), and (Farrell ms)). Either way, it is with claims of 
the latter—‘for the subject’-involving—kind that we are concerned with. 
33 See Hellie’s (2007) discussion of (Lormand, 2004) for more on this point. See (Stoljar, 2016) and (Farrell ms) for 
discussions of how we should understand this ‘for’, neither of which supports the self-intimating reading. 
34 These are Weisberg’s labels (2011). As we’ll see, they are misleading, but I’ll use them for ease of presentation. 
Weisberg attributes the zealous reading to Block, although Block denies that this is his view (2011, p. 420).  
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presents a false dilemma. Consider a third reading which is neutral both about 
awareness (i.e., is non-self-intimating) and also about the nature of consciousness. 
The “fewer commitments” principle says we should prefer this—a non-self-
intimating reading—to either the “zealous” or “moderate” readings. 
The third argument for the claim that we should adopt a self-intimating reading of 
SOMETHING—the provenance argument—has two premises.35 The first is that when 
philosophers appeal to the notion of SOMETHING, they understand it in the same 
way as Nagel did in his ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ (1974). The second is that 
Nagel adopted a self-intimating reading of SOMETHING. It is undeniable that the 
popularity of appealing to the notion of there being something it is like for a 
subject to be in a state in discussions of consciousness is due in large part to 
Nagel’s paper.36 And we can assume that—unless they note otherwise—those who 
invoke this notion are not aiming to change the subject: they intend it to be 
understood in roughly the same way that Nagel understood it. Thus the first 
premise is true. 
What about the second premise— that Nagel holds a self-intimating reading of 
SOMETHING? Janzen gives two arguments for this premise. The first appeals to 
Nagel’s use of “the Sartrean terms ‘pour-soi’ (the ‘for-itself’) and ‘en-soi’ (the ‘in-
itself’)” (2011, p. 284) in his (1974). Since Sartre holds that we are always aware of 
our conscious states, Janzen claims, we should interpret Nagel as doing likewise. 
But Nagel does not explain how he understands Sartre’s (French, technical) 
terminology (which Sartre uses to describe objects, not mental states), and uses it 
only once and in passing. And even if this suggests that there is some similarity 
between Nagelian and Sartrean notions of consciousness, there’s no reason to 
think that the similarity concerns awareness of conscious states. So Janzen’s first 
argument fails. 
Janzen’s second argument relies on the claim that Nagel explains the meaning of 
SOMETHING in terms of the subjective/objective distinction which he elsewhere (in 
                                           
35 (Rosenthal, 2000, p. 275), (Janzen, 2011, p. 284), (Weisberg, 2011, p. 427). 
36 This is sometimes accompanied by the claim that ‘something it is like’ and ‘what it is like’ (when used to talk about 
consciousness) have a technical meaning which Nagel introduced. This further claim is false (see Farrell 2016), but 
the provenance argument does not depend on it. 
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his (1965)) explains in terms of “psychological internality”. But Nagel doesn’t 
attempt to explain the meaning of SOMETHING in his 1974 paper. On the contrary, 
he appeals to SOMETHING to explain what subjective character is (1974, p. 436). 
Nor does Nagel use the term ‘psychological internality’ at all (and ‘internality’ only 
once) in his 1965 paper, so it doesn’t seem to be a central notion for him. Nor is it 
obvious that what Nagel refers to by ‘internality’ is to be understood in terms of 
awareness of conscious states. So Janzen’s second argument fails. We have no 
reason to accept the second premise of the provenance argument: that Nagel 
adopted a self-intimating reading of SOMETHING.37 Thus the provenance argument 
fails. 
The fourth argument for the proposition that we ought to adopt a self-intimating 
reading of SOMETHING is the analogical argument. The argument (Janzen, 2011, p. 
283) begins with the claim that ordinary objects can be like something for us—e.g., 
they can look, or smell, like something. It follows from the meaning of ‘There is 
something O looks (or smells, etc.) like for S’ (where ‘O’ stands for an ordinary 
object) that S is aware of O. Thus we reach a subsidiary conclusion: if O is like 
something to S, S is aware of O. Next the analogical claim is made: what goes for 
ordinary objects also goes for mental states. So, if there is something M is like for 
S, then S is aware of M. Since ‘there is something M is like for S’ is true just when 
SOMETHING is, the argument establishes that if there is something it is like for S to 
be in M, then S is aware of M. That is, it establishes that the correct reading of 
SOMETHING is a self-intimating one. 
The analogical argument fails because ‘There is something M is like for S’ does not 
have the same truth conditions as ‘There is something it is like for S to be in M’—
i.e., as SOMETHING. Presumably we are meant to think it does because these are 
just two ways of saying the same thing. And we’re meant to believe this because 
these two sentences are mere grammatical rearrangements of each other: although 
they are distinct sentences, the rules of English grammar allow us to transform one 
into the other without change in meaning. This is so in just the way that ‘Adam 
loves Eve’ and ‘Eve is loved by Adam’ are grammatical rearrangements of each 
                                           
37 Indeed, as we’ll see in §4.1, Nagel adopts a non-self-intimating reading. 
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other, as are ‘It’s embarrassing that he is drunk’ and ‘That he is drunk is 
embarrassing.’ 
But ‘There is something M is like for S’ is not a grammatical rearrangement of 
SOMETHING as we can see by considering similarly structured sentences. 
(a) There is some time it takes for Rihanna to run a mile. 
is a rearrangement of 
(b) There is some time running a mile takes for Rihanna. 
To make the rearrangement, we take the infinitive verb phrase from (a) (‘to run a 
mile’), change the verb to the ‘-ing’ form (‘running a mile’), and then move this 
phrase from the end of the sentence into the location of ‘it’, giving us (b). If we 
apply these rules to ‘There is something it is like for S to be in M’, we take the 
phrase ‘to be in M’, change ‘be’ to ‘being’, and move the verb phrase into the 
location occupied by ‘it’, producing 
(c) There is something being in M is like for S. 
Clearly, (c) is not the sentence involved in the analogical argument, which is 
(d) There is something M is like for S. 
Nor can we get (d) by rearranging (c): (c) does not mean what (d) means. If (c) did 
mean what (d) means then the meaning of ‘being in M’ in (c) would have to be the 
same as that of ‘M’ in (d), but it is not. The analogical argument, then, depends on 
a claim—that (d) is a grammatical rearrangement of SOMETHING—which is false. 
We might hope to fix the argument by amending the analogical premise so that we 
rely on the (true) claim that SOMETHING is a grammatical rearrangement of (c). 
This requires that what we have on the “mental” side of the analogy is being in a 
mental state, rather than a mental state. But then what is on the “object” side of the 
analogy? There seem to be three options. First, that being in a mental state is 
analogous to an ordinary object. But this is implausible: these are very different kinds 
of things. Nor is the second option—that being in a mental state is analogous to being 
in an object—plausible: the second ‘in’ indicates spatial containment, the first does 
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not. The third option is that it is perceiving an object which is analogous to being in a 
mental state. But what is analogous to the former in the mental realm is surely 
perceiving—not being in—a mental state. There is no plausible analogical claim that can 
get us where the analogical argument needs to go. Thus the argument fails. 
We’ve examined four attempts to show that we ought to adopt a self-intimating 
reading of SOMETHING, and all four fail. We have no reason to revise our view that 
it is the non-self-intimating reading of SOMETHING which is the standard one. 
4 The HO reading of SOMETHING and WHAT 
If ambitious HO theorists are to resist the misrepresentation and affirm the 
awareness arguments they must hold that if SOMETHING is true then S is now 
undergoing what-it-is-like-ness associated with M, that S is aware of M, and that S’s 
undergoing what-it-is-like-ness associated with M does not require that S be in M. 
In other words, they must adopt an occurrent, self-intimating reading of 
SOMETHING and a loose reading of WHAT. How do ambitious HO theorists 
understand these notions? 
I’ll take Rosenthal to be representative when he says, “As many, myself included, 
use that phrase, there being something it’s like for one to be in a state is simply its 
seeming subjectively that one is in that state.” (Rosenthal, 2011, p. 433)38 And, as 
Rosenthal understands ‘seeming subjectively’, when it seems subjectively to us that 
we are in some state, M, we represent ourselves as being in M. We do this by way 
of being in a HO state (for Rosenthal, a thought) which is about M. What it is like 
for S to be in M, on this understanding, is just how S represents M as being: what it 
is like for me to have a migraine is just how I represent my migraine state to be. 
This gives us what I’ll call the HO reading of SOMETHING and WHAT. On this 
reading of SOMETHING, there is something it is like for S to be in M just when S is 
in a HO state which represents M. And there being an occurrence of what-it-is-
like-ness associated with M is just there being some way that S represents M as 
being—i.e., S’s being in a HO state which represents M. Thus on the HO reading, 
                                           
38 For a similar statement, see (Weisberg, 2011, p. 414). 
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the notions of SOMETHING and WHAT are very closely linked: there is something it 
is like for S to be in M just when there is an occurrence of what-it-is-like-ness 
associated with M, i.e., just when S has a HO state which represents M. 
We can see that the HO reading is just what ambitious HO theorists need. It is 
occurrent: there being something it is like for S to be in M entails that there is an 
occurrence of what-it-is-like-ness associated with M. It is a self-intimating reading: 
there being something it is like for S to be in M means that S has a HO state that 
represents M, and so S is thereby aware of M. And it is a loose reading of WHAT: 
that there is an occurrence of what-it-is-like-ness—that S represents M—is 
compatible with S not being in M. The HO reading is non-standard on every 
dimension—the standard reading is occurrent, tight and non-self-intimating—but 
this doesn’t mean that this reading is in some way illegitimate or unacceptable. 
Adopting the HO reading means that ambitious theorists can resist the 
misrepresentation argument and so hold on to their ambitions. And they can assert 
the awareness argument which links what-it-is-like consciousness with TP 
consciousness. At least, this is how things initially seem, and it is how those 
sympathetic to HO theories take things to stand (e.g., (Rosenthal, 2011), 
(Weisberg, 2011), (Shepherd, 2013)). But more needs to be said. 
4.1 The arguments again 
If we adopt the HO reading, the misrepresentation argument fails because premise 
(M4) is false. The awareness argument, on the other hand, appears sound since the 
crucial premise there, (A2), comes out as true. But how we understand SOMETHING 
and WHAT does not just affect how we understand (M4) and (A2). If each 
argument is to remain valid, we must adopt the HO reading throughout. In 
particular, we must adopt this reading when it comes to the claim which appears in 
both arguments (as (A1) and (M2)): 
(A1/M2) If M is conscious, then there is something it is like for S to be 
in M. 
The reason given above (§2, §3) for accepting (A1/M2) was that it follows from 
the popular Nagelian definition of consciousness: 
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ND M is conscious iff there is something it is like for S to be in M. 
As noted (§3.2), ND’s popularity stems from Nagel’s use of sentences like 
SOMETHING to characterise conscious states. Thus what is popularly taken to be 
plausible is that, if we understand SOMETHING more or less as Nagel did then ND 
captures something important about conscious states. If we are to adopt the HO 
reading throughout the misrepresentation and awareness arguments, and to 
motivate (A1/M2) by noting that it follows from ND, then it must be that the HO 
reading more or less accords with the Nagelian reading. Note that the claim here is 
not that Nagel has any special authority in deciding in how we understand 
SOMETHING as it appears in ND. The claim is rather that we ought to understand 
SOMETHING in ND in the same general way as the very many philosophers who 
appeal to this definition do (this is where the authority lies). And—as the 
popularity of appealing to such notions in discussions of consciousness in the years 
following Nagel’s paper shows—the way these very many philosophers understand 
SOMETHING in ND is in roughly the way that Nagel did. 
As we saw in §3.2 there is no reason to think that Nagel adopts the HO reading of 
SOMETHING. Further, it is clear that Nagel does not understand SOMETHING in this 
way. Nagel’s thesis in his (1974) is that physicalism is in trouble. One of the 
physicalist theories Nagel is criticising (n1, 435) is Armstrong’s (1968) HO theory 
of consciousness. It is just implausible, then, that Nagel thinks that there being 
something it is like for a subject to be in a state—the feature he thinks physicalism 
cannot account for—should be understood in terms of our being in a HO state 
which represents these states—a phenomena that physicalist HO theorists such as 
Armstrong, plausibly can (at least insofar as anything Nagel says) account for.39 
And this should not be surprising given the discussions above: the standard way of 
understanding SOMETHING and WHAT are those in the Nagelian tradition. And 
we’ve seen that the HO reading is non-standard on every dimension. 
                                           
39 For this to be true, it doesn’t matter whether Nagel is correct to think that HO theories cannot account for 
consciousness. All that matters is that Nagel clearly understands SOMETHING in a way such that it doesn’t 
straightforwardly follow from the very notion of there being something it is like for S to be in M, that HO theories 
account for consciousness in this sense. This is compatible with it being true that HO theories can account for what-
it-is-like consciousness. So we are not begging the question against HO theories here. 
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It is true as Weisberg says, that “there is another way to interpret Nagel’s phrase” 
(Weisberg, 2011, p. 411) than the standard way. But to interpret the phrase as it 
appears in ND in this other way—a way different to that in which Nagel and the 
many following him who use this phrase to pick out conscious states do—is to 
misinterpret the definition, and so to change the subject. If ND as it is standardly 
understood is true (and the many who appeal to it surely take it to be so), then ND 
understood according to the HO reading is false.40 
Our reason for accepting (A1/M2) was that it follows from ND. But if we 
understand (A1/M2) according to the HO reading, it doesn’t follow from ND (on 
the standard reading). It does follow from ND (on the HO reading), but on this 
reading ND is false, so this doesn’t help. Thus we have no reason to accept 
(A1/M2) understood according to the HO reading. This means that the awareness 
argument fails: if (A1) is to be true, we must adopt the standard, non-HO reading 
of SOMETHING; if (A2) is to be true, we must adopt the non-standard, HO reading. 
But if we do this we equivocate, and so the resulting argument is invalid. A similar 
problem arises for the misrepresentation argument: if the argument is understood 
as its proponents intend then the standard reading of SOMETHING must be adopted 
throughout. To attempt to understand the argument in accordance with a different 
reading—such as the HO reading—is just to change the subject, and any response 
to this argument is not a response to the misrepresentation argument opponents of 
HO theories present. 
4.2 A response 
Ambitious HO theorists might respond to this line of thought as follows: HO 
theories are only committed to accounting for what-it-is-like consciousness when 
this is understood according to the HO reading. Whether or not HO theories can 
account for what-it-is-like consciousness on some other, non-HO-reading, is 
                                           
40 For both ND(HO) and ND(standard) to both be true, SOMETHING (on the HO reading) would have to be true 
when, and only when, SOMETHING (on the standard reading) was true. But this is not so: the latter can be true in 
situations in which there is no occurrence of what-it-is-like-ness associated with M; the former cannot. Of course, 
both ND(HO) and ND(standard) can be true if we take ‘conscious’ to mean different things in these two readings 
of the definition. But this doesn’t help the HO theorist (see §4.2 below). 
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irrelevant.41 One way to put this response is to note that, in some theoretical 
contexts it can be useful to understand terms in a non-standard way, and to add 
that we are now in such a context.42 
HO theorists are free, of course, to decide what their theory is a theory of, and to 
only present the awareness argument in the kind of theoretical context which 
favours or allows the HO reading. If this is how things stand, however, it is hard to 
see what distinguishes ambitious HO theorists—which now means those who aim 
to account for what-it-is-like consciousness but only on the HO reading—and modest 
HO theorists—those who only aim to account for consciousness in the sense 
given by the transitivity principle, TP. On the HO reading, there is no interesting 
difference between ND and TP given that HO theorists explain a state’s being 
conscious in the TP sense in terms of its being the target of an appropriate HO 
state. Thus there is no difference between ambitious and modest HO theories and 
no interesting sense in which HO theories can account for what-it-is-like 
consciousness. 
HO theorists are not free, however, to interpret the misrepresentation argument as 
concerning what-it-is-like consciousness on the HO reading. As noted above, to 
do so is not to consider the argument they are presented with. They can, of course, 
say that they are only interested in what-it-is-like consciousness in those theoretical 
contexts in which the HO reading is appropriate. To do this, however, is just to 
acknowledge that they are not offering an ambitious HO theory: they do not aim 
to account for what-it-is-like consciousness as this is standardly understood. 
5 Conclusion 
I have argued that ambitious HO theories of consciousness fail. The claim is not 
that HO theories fail because adopting a non-standard reading of WHAT and 
SOMETHING is somehow undesirable or unacceptable: I do not claim that there is 
anything problematic with the HO reading itself. Instead, they fail because 
                                           
41 See (Weisberg, 2011). A natural way of doing this is by holding—as suggested in footnote 40—that ‘conscious’ is 
to be understood differently as it appears in the HO reading of ND and the standard reading of ND. 
42 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this way of understanding this response. 
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responding to the misrepresentation argument as understood in accordance with 
the HO reading is not to respond to the argument at all: it is to offer no response 
to the argument that concludes that HO theorist cannot account for what-it-is-like 
consciousness as this is standardly understood—i.e., as relevant to that notion of 
consciousness which Nagel suggests makes the mind-body problem intractable. 
And the awareness argument—which is also advanced by self-representational 
theorists (see (Kriegel, 2012))—only succeeds if we adopt the HO reading. But 
doing so fails to establish a link between what-it-is-like consciousness (as 
standardly understood) and consciousness as understood in terms of the 
transitivity principle, TP. Perhaps HO theories can account for what-it-is-like-ness 
in a non-standard sense, but this amounts to nothing more than accounting for TP 
consciousness—there is nothing ambitious about such a theory. 
I also described three pairs of contrasting ways of understanding two notions 
central to discussions of consciousness in the literature, namely: 
SOMETHING There is something it is like for S to be in M. 
WHAT There is an occurrence of what-it-is-like-ness associated with M. 
Getting clear about how we understand these notions allows us to see that the 
misrepresentation argument against ambitious HO theories succeeds while the 
awareness argument in favour of them fails. Although I have not considered the 
question here, attending to these distinctions may help shed light on other debates 
concerning consciousness. 
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